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Abstract
We investigate the e¤ects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy lings on product market
competition using data from the US airline industry. We nd that bankrupt air-
lines permanently downsize their national route structure, their airport-specic
networks, and their route-specic ight frequency and capacity. We also nd
that bankrupt airlines lower their route-specic prices while under bankruptcy
protection, and increase them after emerging. We do not nd robust evidence
of signicant changes by the bankrupt airlines competitors along any of the
dimensions above. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
bankruptcy is the result of a war of attrition over capacity and network cutbacks.
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1 Introduction
In the past few years thousands of rms have led for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Law.1 Firms ling for bankruptcy
protection belong to a wide range of industries, from Lehman Brothers to Chrysler
and GM.2 The unprecedented number of lings has led to a renewed interest in the
economics of bankruptcy. Most of the previous work has examined the direct costs
of bankruptcy proceedings, such as legal and administrative expenses, as well as their
indirect costs, such as lost sales (Franks and Torous (1989), Thorburn (2000), Bris,
Welch, and Zhu (2006), Hennesy and Whited (2007), Bebchuk (2002)).3 There is
also work on the e¤ects of bankruptcy on rm survival (Hotchkiss (1995)), on equity
returns (Jorion and Zhang (2008)), and on innovation (Acharya and Subramanian
(2009)). Nonetheless, there is surprisingly little work on the e¤ects of bankruptcy
lings on product market competition.
This paper uses data from the US airline industry to investigate the e¤ect of
Chapter 11 lings on prices, capacity choices, and networks. These data are from
one single industry for which we have data from a cross-section of local markets.
This allows an examination of how bankruptcy lings a¤ect the strategic decisions
of rms, holding industry xed. In this sense, our approach is in the same spirit
as Chevalier (1995), who uncovers basic stylized patterns in the relationship between
leverage buyouts and the pricing behavior of rms and their rivals using cross-section
data from the US supermarket industry.
The airline industry provides an interesting empirical framework for several addi-
tional reasons. First, it is an industry of strategic importance in the United States.
Second, the airlines seeking bankruptcy protection form a heterogeneous group, in-
cluding low cost carriers such as ATA, and national carriers such as United and
USAir. The range of variation in the identities of the bankrupt airlines ensures that
1There has also been an outstanding number of personal bankruptcy lings. See White [2007] for
more on this.
2Lehman Brothers led in July 2008. Chrysler and GM led in April and June 2009; respectively.
3See also the early work by White [1982].
our empirical analysis provides insights on other industries as well. Third, because
it is one industry where carriers interact over many distinct markets and over time,
we can identify the e¤ects of bankruptcy on product market competition, indepen-
dent of potentially confounding market, rm, and time e¤ects. Finally, because there
are bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers serving the same market, we can investigate
di¤erent carriersprice reactions to one carriers bankruptcy.
We start our analysis by looking at how bankruptcy lings a¤ect the network of
the bankrupt carrier and of its rivals. We nd that at the US national level, the
bankrupt carrier permanently drops approximately 25 percent of its pre-bankruptcy
routes. We also look at airport specic networks. Not surprisingly, we nd similar
results. The bankrupt carrier reduces its average number of markets out of an airport
by 26 percent while under bankruptcy protection, and by 24 after its emergence from
Chapter 11 relative to its pre-bankruptcy numbers. Its rivals increase the number of
markets they serve at the US national level, but this result is not very robust across
specications and we do not conrm it when we look at changes in the number of
markets out of airports.
Next, we investigate how bankruptcy lings a¤ect ight frequency and capacity
decisions. We nd that the bankrupt rm lowers by 21 percent the frequency of
ights within a route while operating under court protection, and by 32:8 percent
once the carrier emerges from bankruptcy. We also nd that bankruptcy lings have
an equally signicant e¤ect on the bankrupts capacity (measured by seats in a route)
both during and following a bankruptcy ling. We do not nd robust evidence of any
signicant changes by the bankrupt airlines competitors along any of the dimensions
above.
We conclude our analysis with a study of the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on airline
market prices. We nd that the insolvent carriers price drops by 3:1 percent while
under bankruptcy protection, and increase by almost 5 percent after emerging, both
of these numbers relative to pre-bankruptcy prices. Again, we do not nd evidence
of any signicant changes by the bankrupt airlines competitors along any of the
dimensions above.
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To our knowledge, there is no simple theoretical connection between bankruptcy
lings and market competition. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with the idea,
often repeated in the mass media, that bankruptcy lings are the result of wars of
attrition over capacity and network cutbacks. An illuminating piece of anecdotal evi-
dence in this regard is given by a recent statement Robert Crandall, former chairman
and CEO of American Airlines, who blames Chapter 11 for encouragingcarriers to
engage in unprotable wars of attrition, since it ultimately grants the loser a second
chance at survival:4
Chapter 11 undermines responsible managements. In an intensely competi-
tive industry providing a commodity product, the dumbest competitorun-
restrained by fear of failure sets the standard. Thus, when (...) an improvident
management adds unrewarding capacity or uneconomic service features, other
managements are compelled to choose between matching the new industry stan-
dardand tolerating labor unrest and lost revenues. (...) few managements have
been able to resist the perpetual game of follow the leader.
The picture that the CEO of American Airlines depicts of the airline industry is one
where all rms would benet from a capacity reduction as demand declines. Yet, since
capacity cutbacks are a public good that must be provided privately, each rm waits
for its competitors to cut capacity rst.5 Unless the industry outlook improves, the
rm generating the lowest cashows and with the weakest nancial position becomes
unable to meet its debt obligations, ultimately having to seek bankruptcy protection.
Firms engage in such a war of attrition when Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code is an option, since this law protects the insolvent rm from liquidation by
creditors, and allows the rm to void contracts and reorganize its business strategy,
e¤ectively granting the rm a second chance at life. Operating under Chapter 11, the
4Co¤ee, Tea ... or Bankruptcy? The Wall Street Journal, September 16; 2005: And Scott
McCartney, author of The Middle Seat: Why Bad News for Airlines Is Good News for Fliers - At
least in the Short Term, (The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2004), states: Theres too much
capacity in the skies for airlines to raise their prices (...) If the industry is to improve its nancial
footing, weaker companies have to fall by the wayside, taking capacity out so that prices can line up
with actual costs.
5See Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ [1990].
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insolvent rm reduces capacity and downsizes its network, which can lead to higher
product-market prices. This is the channel through which we link bankruptcy lings
to product market price, capacity, and network e¤ects.
This article contributes to the sparse empirical literature on product market com-
petition and bankruptcy. Borenstein and Rose (1995, 2003) also study the relation-
ship between bankruptcy lings and product market competition.6 They look at
the e¤ect on prices and on frequency. They nd that in the quarter during which a
carrier les for Chapter 11 protection, the number of ights at the airports where the
bankrupt carrier operates declines by about 20 percent relative to the pre-bankruptcy
level. Borenstein and Rose (1995) do not nd any systematic evidence that either
bankrupt rms or their competitors changed prices after a bankrupt rms Chapter
11 ling. Mainly, our analysis di¤ers from theirs along four dimensions. First, we
look at multiple strategic decisions (network structure, capacity choices, prices) and
relate them within a unied framework. Second, we investigate the e¤ects during
and after a competitors bankruptcy ling. The post-emergence analysis adds to our
understanding of what the permanentchanges are in the set of services o¤ered fol-
lowing a rms bankruptcy ling. Third, we show that the e¤ects are fundamentally
di¤erent for the bankrupt rms and their rivals. In contrast, Borenstein and Rose
(1995, 2003) estimate the average e¤ect across both ling and non-ling carriers, and
therefore they do not identify the e¤ect on the ling carrier from that on its competi-
tors. Fourth, we include specications that control for such unobserved heterogeneity
using route-carrier xed e¤ects, since it is likely that there are heterogeneous route-
carrier unobservables that might confound the results in Borenstein and Rose (1995,
2003).
This work is also related to a growing theoretical literature that examines whether
6 In addition to the di¤erences discussed in the body of the article, our analysis di¤ers from theirs
along two other dimensions. First, it is likely that there are heterogeneous route-carrier unobservables
that might confound the results in Borenstein and Rose (2003). We control for this using route-
carrier xed e¤ects. Second, bankruptcy categorical variables might proxy for the changes in the
services that the (bankrupt and non-bankrupt) rms provided even when no carrier was operating
under bankruptcy protection. We include carrier specic dummies in order to avoid confounding the
bankruptcy e¤ects with the carrier-specic e¤ects.
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a rms capital structure impacts competition in the market for the rms products.
This literature focuses on how nancial distress impacts the competitive interaction
of distressed and non-distressed rms in an industry (Brander and Lewis (1986),
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Hendel (1996), Dasgupta and Titman (1998)). Sev-
eral empirical papers followed providing evidence of the interaction between nancial
distress and product market competition (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1995, 1996), Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), Campello
(2006), and Kovenock and Phillips (1995). Within this literature, the closest pa-
per to ours is Chevalier (1995a). Our paper di¤ers from hers along one important
dimension: we have data on the individual price of the rms, while Chevalier only
has data on the average price in a market. This additional information is of crucial
importance in our empirical analysis since we do not nd evidence of almost any
reaction by the rivals of rm that les for Chapter 11 protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) describes airline
bankruptcies. Section (3) describes the data. Section (4) discusses the identication
strategy and the empirical specication. Section (5) presents the results from the
empirical analysis of the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on the airlinesnetworks. Section
(6) investigates the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on capacity choices (seats and ight
frequency). Section (7) investigates the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on prices. Section
(8) concludes.
2 Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry
2.1 The Legal Setting
The United States Bankruptcy Code contemplates two alternative solutions for rms
in nancial distress ling for court protection: Chapter 7 and Chapter 11.
Chapter 7, entitled Liquidation, allows for an orderly, court-supervised procedure
by which a trustee collects the assets of the rm, reduces them to cash, and makes dis-
tributions to creditors subject to the debtors right to retain certain exempt property
and to the rights of secured creditors. Chapter 11, entitled Reorganization, allows
4
the bankrupt rm to continue operating while the rms management restructures
the rms business. Firms that le for Chapter 11 are those deemed a viable ongoing
concern which can potentially repay creditors through a court-approved reorganiza-
tion plan.7 We focus on Chapter 11 lings and drop rms ling under Chapter 7
because we are interested in the competitive and strategic e¤ect triggered by a rm
in the market that operates under bankruptcy protection, and rms ling for Chapter
7 stop operations and liquidate their assets.
A Chapter 11 reorganization plan must provide creditors with a disclosure state-
ment containing information that is adequate for creditors to evaluate the plan. The
creditors then vote on this plan. If accepted, the rm continues to operate as a going
concern. If rejected, the court can allow management to present a new reorganization
plan, which is eventually presented to creditors for a vote. If, after several iterations,
creditors continue to reject the rms reorganization plan, the court can force an
involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation.8 If, instead, the plan is approved then the debtor
can reduce its debts by repaying a portion of its obligations and discharging others.
The debtor can also terminate burdensome contracts and leases, recover assets, and
re-scale its operations in order to return to protability. Two important sections of
Chapter 11 specically grant airlines a greater ability to renegotiate contracts with
employees and with aircraft lessors: sections 1113 and 1110, which will be discussed
below.
Several factors that can alter the competitive interaction between rms in an
industry come into play when one of the rms reorganizes under Chapter 11. First,
the bankrupt rm faces cost shocks inherent to operating under court protection,
such as the ability to renege and renegotiate contracts. Furthermore, the bankrupt
rm faces demand shocks that can result in reduced demand for its products, as in
Opler and Titman (1994). Finally, reorganization might entail changes in the rms
7The automatic stay protects the debtor by suspending collection activities, foreclosures, and
repossessions of property by the creditors on any debt that arose before the ling of the bankruptcy
petition.
8See Eraslan (2007), and Eraslan and Yilmaz (2007) for more on the negotiations that occur
during Chapter 11.
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product quality (see Maksimovic and Titman (1991)), inventory (Hendel (1996)), and
capacity. These also have the potential to disrupt the competitive interaction of rms
in the industry.
We cannot capture cost related shocks using accounting data on costs because
these report exactly those liabilities which are renegotiated under bankruptcy, and
hence do not reveal exogenous cost shocks. Demand shocks, such as changes in the
reputation and consumer condence in the rm, are not observable. Furthermore, as
managers look for a business plan that can turn the rm into a protable enterprise,
the rms operating strategy changes continuously. Therefore, to capture all of these
changes we use bankruptcy categorical variables. Below we summarize the information
used to derive and construct these categorical variables.
2.2 Stylized Facts of Airline Bankruptcies
Airlines that have led for bankruptcy in the last two decades are identied using the
Air Transportation Association (ATA) website9. This website provides a list of the
names of air carriers that have led for protection, the date of the bankruptcy ling,
and the type of protection that the airline requested (reorganization under Chapter
11 or liquidation under Chapter 7). We cross check this data with the Bankruptcy
Research Database compiled by Professor Lynn LoPucki.10
For each of the airlines ling for Chapter 11 between 1992 and 2007, we manually
search Factiva and Lexis-Nexus for news report dating to about one year prior to
and two years after the rms ling. This allows us to include items such as whether
the ling was voluntary or not, whether the airline originally led for Chapter 11
but was forced to convert its ling to Chapter 7, whether the carrier emerged from
bankruptcy or not, the date and the way in which the carrier exited bankruptcy, if
the carrier was grounded and if so the date when it stopped ying, and if grounding
9The data is complied from ATA research, DOT records, The Bankruptcy Virus in the U.S. Air-
line Industry: Causes and Cures,Aviation Forecasting and Economics and The George Washington
University, Lehman Brothers Equity Research, BankruptcyData.com, Chicago Tribune.
10This database includes Chapter 11 bankruptcies that satisfy two requirements: rst, the debtor
must have assets worth at least $100 million at the time of ling, measured in 1980 dollars, and as
listed on the last 10k led prior to bankruptcy; and second, the debtor is required to le 10ks with
the SEC.
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was voluntary or a safety requirement imposed by the FAA.
Table 1 summarizes some stylized facts. Consistent with Bris et al. (2006) and
Chen and Schoar (2007), this table reveals signicant heterogeneity among bankrupt-
cies. This is most evident in the range of time that the rm spends under bankruptcy
(from 18 days for Air South to 1; 513 days for United Airlines), the way in which the
rm resolves its bankruptcy (emerging or having to convert to Chapter 7 liquida-
tion); and the specic way in which the emerging rm exits bankruptcy (on its own,
or merging with another carrier).
Columns 3 and 4 show that almost all airlines rst le for Chapter 11 protec-
tion. Large airlines soon begin to develop a reorganization plan. Smaller carriers
rst attempt to keep the business alive by seeking an investor that would buy the
carriers ying certicate and any other assets the carrier might still posses. If the
carriers management is unsuccessful at nding such investor(s), the carrier converts
its Chapter 11 ling into a Chapter 7 ling. For instance, in the case of MarkAirs
second ling the U.S. Bankruptcy court changed the carriers Chapter 11 ling to
Chapter 7, after the carrier spent 8 months under Chapter 11. Column 5 shows that
in only two cases, Sun Country and Eastwind, the ling was a Chapter 7 Liquidation
initiated by the carriers creditors who took the rm to court.11 Some airlines le for
Chapter 11 protection multiple times (Column 6). The probability that it emerges
as an independent entity declines with the number of past lings and with shorter
time spans between lings (Columns 7 to 11). For example, USAir emerged from its
second Chapter 11 ling after merging with America West, and TWA emerged from
its third ling after being acquired by American. We expect the competitive behavior
to change di¤erently when carriers le for the rst time, or for subsequent times and,
indeed, this is what we nd in our empirical analysis. Column 12 shows substantial
heterogeneity in the time that a rm can operate under Chapter 11 protection. There
is no clear relationship between the duration and the probability of emergence from
bankruptcy.
11Lessors forced an involuntary liquidation of Sun Country Airlines. The FAA grounded Kiwi
Airlines, MarkAir, and ProAir for safety concerns, training and maintenance violations. Unless the
airline is already under court protection, the FAA grounding precipitates a bankruptcy ling.
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Overall, airlines seeking bankruptcy protection form a heterogeneous group. The
large variation in the characteristics of the bankrupt airlines ensures that our empir-
ical analysis provides insight into other industries as well.
2.3 The Economics of Airline Industry Bankruptcy Filings
The reorganization of the rms operating plan during bankruptcy can result in
changes in the markets served, as well as in the way these markets are served.12
For example, after ling for bankruptcy protection on September 14, 2005, Delta
Airlines implemented several major changes. One of the most important ones was
its decision to abandon the Dallas/Fort Worth airport as one of its hubs. This led to
fewer non-stop destinations out of Dallas, and fewer ights on the routes that were
still served.
2.3.1 Changes in Airline Networks and Capacity Reductions
During reorganization, the insolvent rm might downsize operations in markets bur-
dened with excess capacity and in the least protable markets. Carriers can also
downsize capacity within a market by adjusting the number of seats o¤ered and the
number of performed departures. The freed capacity can be reallocated to markets
that are more protable. In particular, Sections 1110 and 1113 of Chapter 11 facil-
itate these strategic changes as they allow the bankrupt carrier to adjust capacity
without incurring major costs or contract violations, by granting insolvent carriers
the freedom to rescind leases on gates, hangars, and aircraft, and to unilaterally
modify labor agreements.13
12Bankrupt rms in the retail industry commonly close stores and change the style of remaining
ones. While under bankruptcy, Kmart closed more than 300 stores in the U.S. and introduced ve
prototype stores with a new logo and layout. During Montgomery Wards bankruptcy ling in 1997,
the company closed 250 retail locations in 30 states across the U.S., abandoned the speciality store
strategy, rebranded the chain as Wards, and spent millions of dollars to renovate its outlets.
13For instance, Delta rejected and restructured dozens of leases at the Tampa, Dallas and Orlando
airports.
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2.3.2 Cost Cutting Strategies
Under bankruptcy, the insolvent carrier can implement cost-cutting strategies that
are illegal outside of court protection, thus facilitating the rms return to protability.
Leases. Under Section 1110 of Chapter 11, a bankrupt carrier that has defaulted
on its aircraft lease payments has a 60 day grace period to make lease payments and
keep the aircraft. If after 60 days the carrier has not paid its outstanding lease, the
lessor can re-possess the aircraft. Rarely have lessors repossessed aircrafts.14 Most
lessors are willing to renegotiate payments with the bankrupt carrier because a lessor
who repossesses a plane would have to redeploy it elsewhere, and if the industry is in
distress, that might be more costly than extending payment schedules or renegotiating
payment terms. Furthermore, since rescinded leases become a general unsecured
claim on the carrier, the carrier has a strong bargaining position with their lessor.15
In rare instances, lessors force a Chapter 11 ling over missed lease payments.16
Pension Payments and the PBGC. One of the largest burdens a¤ecting most
carriers are obligations to employees and retirees through dened benet pension
programs. Most legacy carriers under bankruptcy protection use their bankruptcy
lings to renegotiate or renege on their dened benet pension obligations. Doing
so transfers the burden of pension obligations to taxpayers via the Federal Pension
Benet Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).17 Cost reductions resulting from changes
in dened benet pension programs should outlast the rms stay under bankruptcy
protection.
14Repossessions have occurred for small carriers: MarkAir (second bankruptcy), Western Pacic,
and Sun Country.
15During Continentals second bankruptcy ling 12 aircraft leasing companies agreed to defer,
reduce, or forgive lease payments on 98 planes in Continentals eet. America West negotiated rent
relief on aircarfts leased from Ansett Worldwide Aviation Services. ATA returned 18 planes to lessor
General Electric. Delta Airlines requested court approval to reject leases on its aircrafts.
16Lessors of US Air considered ling a lawsuit against the carrier. But Brad Gupta, the president
of Ameriquest Holdings, a US Airways lessor, publicly stated on July 25; 2002 that would leave the
lessor facing lower lease rates and lower demand for rejected leases. This discouraged the lessors
lawsuit.
17Under United Airlines reorganization plan, the PBGC took over all four of the airlines under-
funded pension plans. Immediately after ling for Chapter 11, Northwest and Delta Airlines sought
court permission to cut o¤ payments to the bulk of the retirement annuities received by thousands
of former employees.
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Labor Renegotiations. Labor union contracts heavily burden the airline industry.
Renegotiations with unions and employees is a key cost-saving strategy in which
airlines engage while operating under protection. The threat that the carrier can be
forced into liquidation, leaving employees jobless, makes labor unions and employees
more willing to renegotiate than they would otherwise be. Under Section 1113 of
Chapter 11, an airline can unilaterally modify labor agreements if negotiations turn
out to be unsuccessful.18 Just the threat that the bankrupt carrier can turn to Section
1113 shifts most of the bargaining power to the airline.
2.3.3 Demand E¤ects of Bankruptcy Filings
A bankruptcy ling can a¤ect consumerswillingness to pay for the services that the
insolvent rm provides. Such a negative demand shock might reverse once the carrier
exits bankruptcy.
Reputation Costs. Reputation costs associated with a bankruptcy ling can re-
duce the demand for the carriers ights. Opler and Titman (1994) show that highly
leveraged rms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively nanced
competitors during industry downturns. Similarly, bankrupt rms (which represent
the extreme case of excessive leverage) might lose signicant market share to com-
petitors.
Loyalty. Safety consideration aside, passengers might still prefer to y non-bankrupt
carriers if they are concerned that the insolvent rm will not honor its frequent ier
obligations. Passengers have voiced concerns that, even if the carrier emerges from
bankruptcy, frequent ier miles might not be honored.19 This can drive demand away
from the distressed carrier to its non-distressed competitor.
18When US Airwaysmechanics wouldnt join other unions in making voluntary concessions, the
carriers CEO, David Siegel, led for Chapter 11. The carriers ability to void labor contracts with the
bankruptcy judges approval allowed Siegel to win concessions from the mechanics. During United
Airlines reorganization, the carrier led a motion with the bankruptcy court to void the unionslabor
contracts and impose new terms to signicantly cut the carriers expenses. Notice that Section 1113
is not specic to airlines, while Section 1110 is.
19A December 11; 2002 article in the WSJ reveals Uniteds concern with reputation e¤ects following
its bankruptcy ling: United Airlines has launched a national advertising campaign to reassure
customers that it will keep ying following its bankruptcy-law ling,...The all-text, black-and-white
ads assure customers that United, a unit of UAL, is honoring tickets and frequent-ier miles.
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3 Data Description
Our data is an original compilation from several sources. From the Air Transportation
Association Web site, Lynn LoPuckis Bankruptcy Database, and Factiva and Lexis-
Nexis reports, we obtain the identity of carriers ling for bankruptcy, the dates on
which each carrier entered and exited court protection, and the specic way in which
each carrier emerged from protection. We merge this dataset with data from The On-
Time Performance Schedule gathered by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS); the T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the BTS; the Origin
and Destination Surveys (DB1B), which is a ten percent sample of airline tickets sold
by airlines within a quarter.
3.1 Carriers, Markets, and Routes
Carrier Denition. We consider nine national carriers between 1997 and 2007:
American (identied by its airline code, AA), Continental (CO), Delta (DL), America
West (HP; until the third quarter of 2005), Northwest (NW ), Trans World Airlines
(TWA, until the second quarter of 2001), United (UA), USAir (US), and Southwest
(WN). Low cost carriers are grouped in a category labeled LCC (e.g., Jet Blue and
Frontier are in the LCC group).20 This allows us to keep small carriers that are
present in only a few markets or for a few quarters when we include route-carrier
xed e¤ects. Furthermore, it allows us to use a meaningful grouping that captures
the impact of small carrier presence in the market. In the LCC category we exclude
three low cost carriers which we choose to study independently: Airtran (FL), ATA
(TZ), and National (N7). We do this because they either had a strong presence
(Airtran) or they led for Chapter 11 during our sample period (ATA and National).
Bankrupt Carriers. Next, we identify airlines that have led for bankruptcy pro-
tection between 1997 and 2007 from the Air Transportation Association website.21
20For each route-year-quarter, we take the averages across the low cost carriers for the control
variables.
21The data is complied from ATA research, DOT records, The Bankruptcy Virus in the U.S. Air-
line Industry: Causes and Cures,Aviation Forecasting and Economics and The George Washington
University, Lehman Brothers Equity Research, BankruptcyData.com, and the Chicago Tribune.
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This website provides a list of the names of air carriers that have led for bankruptcy
protection, the date of the bankruptcy ling, and the type of protection requested
by the airline (Chapter 11 or Chapter 7). We cross check this data with the Bank-
ruptcy Research Database, compiled by Professor Lynn LoPucki.22 There are six
carriers operating under bankruptcy protection during our sample period: United
Airlines (December 9, 2002 through February 2, 2006), US Airways (August 11, 2002
through March 31, 2003 and then again September 12, 2004 through September 27,
2005), ATA (October 26; 2004 through February 28, 2006), Delta (September 14,
2005 through May 1, 2007), and Northwest (September 14, 2005 through May 31,
2007). Some small carriers operated under court protection for a small time window,
and thus we cannot consider these carriers independently (E.g., Independence Air op-
erated under court protection between November 7, 2005 and January 5, 2006). We
exclude TWAs third bankruptcy even though it occurred during our sample period
because the rm stayed under bankruptcy protection for less than one quarter. We
also exclude Chapter 7 lings because in that case rms liquidate, and we do not
have information on prices or other strategic variables under liquidation.
Market and Route Denition. We dene a market, denoted by m, as an airport-
to-airport trip, irrespective of the number of connections.23 A route, denoted by r, is
a non-stop airport-to-airport trip. We consider all airport-to-airport pairs between
the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), ranked by population size.
Unit of Observation. We have four units of observation, which vary by the
dataset used in each regression. First, to study the frequency of services, seats, and
load factor, the unit of observation is a carrier, route, year, quarter, combination.
Second, we study prices using a carrier, market, year, quarter unit of observation.
22This database includes all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that satisfy the following two require-
ments. First, the debtor group ling for Chapter 11 protection must have assets worth at least
$100 million at the time of ling (measured in 1980 dollars), as listed in the last 10-K led before
bankruptcy (provided that the 10-K is for a year ending within three years prior to ling for bank-
ruptcy). Second, the debtor group is required to le 10-Ks with the SEC. For airlines satisfying
these requirements, we double check the ling dates, the type of ling, and the date of emergence
where available.
23For example, one market is Chicago OHare (ORD) to Washington Dulles (IAD) and another
market is Chicago Midway (MDW) to Washington National (DCA).
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Third, to study a carriers network extent out of an airport, the unit of observation
is carrier, airport, year, quarter specic. Finally, for the analysis of the number of
markets served in a given quarter, by a given carrier, we use a carrier, year, quarter
unit of observation
We denote carriers by j; airports by a = 1; :::; A; airport-to-airport routes by
r = 1; :::; R; airport-to-airport markets by m = 1; :::;M ; and time period by t =
1; :::T . For example, the combination jrt indicates that airline j (e.g. American)
transports its passengers on route r (Chicago OHare to Fort Lauderdale Airport) at
time t (e.g. the second quarter of 2002). In the rest of the analysis, we let g denote
the geographical scope of the analysis: thus, g 2 fr;m; a; ng, where n indicates that
the information is at the national level and the unit of observation is a carrier-year-
quarter. When g = n there is no cross-section variation across markets, and we only
have time-series variation.
3.2 Bankruptcy Categorical Variables
We dene the set of K carriers that led for bankruptcy protection at some point as
 =

UA;US(1st); US(2nd); NW;DL; TZ;N7
	
. Notice that USAir led for Chapter
11 twice. We use the subscript k = 1; :::;K to denote a bankrupt rm (K is equal to
7). The variables that measure the e¤ect of bankruptcy protection during and after
a rms Chapter 11 ling are described below.
During the Bankruptcy Filing. We want to distinguish the e¤ect that bankruptcy
lings have on the quality measures we consider, for the bankrupt rm, and for its
competitors, during the time when the bankrupt rm operates under Chapter 11, as
well as after the rm emerges from bankruptcy protection. To measure these e¤ects,
we construct the following categorical variables. First, we dene Bktgt equal to 1 if
there is at least one carrier under bankruptcy protection at time t and that carrier
provides service in g (for example, if g = r, then it provides service in route r),
otherwise, Bktgt is equal to zero. For each quality measure, we study the average
e¤ect of bankruptcy across markets and across bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers.
After the Emergence from Bankruptcy. Next, we ask whether any observed
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price changes during bankruptcy persist once the bankrupt rm emerges from court
protection. To do this, we dene the categorical variable AftBktgt equal to 1 if there
is at least one carrier that was under bankruptcy protection at a time before t; and
that carrier currently serves g. Otherwise, AftBktgt is equal to zero.
3.3 Networks, Capacity, and Prices
The following variables are used to measure product market competition.
National Network. We measure the extent to which a carriers downsizing a¤ects
the number of markets served at the national level. We use the scheduling database
to construct the count of origin-destination airport pairs by operating carrier, year,
and quarter. We call NationalNetworkjt the total number of airport-airport com-
binations served by carrier j during year-quarter t.24 On average a carrier serves
446:14 markets over the US.
Airport Network. We build a measure of a carriers network out of the airport of
origin using the scheduling data. The variable AirportNetworkjat equals the number
of routes served out of airport a; by carrier j; in year-quarter t:25 On average a carrier
serves 19 markets out of an airport.
Frequency (Scheduled Departures). We evaluate the ight frequency for each
specic route. There has been active research on the importance of ight frequency
as a determinant of air travel demand.26 An airline that provides a single ight per
day between two airports is forcing a large fraction of travelers to y at a time which
is going to be less attractive than the one o¤ered by an airline that provides two or
more ights per day between the same two airports. To construct a measure of the
ight frequency between two airports, we use the scheduling database which provides
24Notice that for simplicity we have omitted g = n in the subscript of this variable.
25This is a very important variable in the empirical literature of the airline industry. In particular,
it captures the relative attractiveness of an airlines frequent yer program and its other services at
the origin and destination airports (the number of ticket counters, customer service desks, etc.). See
Berry (1990,1992), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), Bamberger and Carlton (2003), Brueckner,
Dyer, and Spiller (1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Ciliberto and Williams (2009).
26Previous work looking at ight frequency as a means for airlines to di¤erentiate their products
have looked at the relationship between ight frequency and mergers (Richard, 2003), market com-
petition (Borenstein and Netz, 1999), the nature of airline networks (Brueckner and Zhang, 2001),
and economies of tra¢ c density (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994)
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information on the number of ights that each carrier schedules and performs in
each market, during a year-quarter period. We compute the sum of the number
of scheduled departures between two airports by operating carrier, route, year, and
quarter. Frequencyjrt equals the total number of departures performed in route r,
on year-quarter t, by carrier j. On average rms o¤er 362:29 ights per quarter in
each route.
Capacity (Seats). The T   100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the
BTS provides data on an airlines capacity, measured by available seats, denoted by
Seatsjrt. On average a carrier transports 45; 846:46 seats per quarter.
Load Factor. We dene a carriers load factor on a route during a year-quarter as
the ratio of the sum of all passengers transported in a market during a year-quarter
to the sum of all available seats for sale on that market, during that year-quarter.
We denote the load factor by LoadFactorjrt.
Prices. To summarize the airline pricing behavior we use the median prices in a
market m, denoted by Farejmt, to exploit information on the distribution of prices
available from the DB1B dataset while using as few statistics as possible.27 We code
a round-trip ticket as one directional trip ticket, which costs half the full round-trip
ticket fare. Fares are measured in 1993 dollars. The average fare for a one-way ticket
is 126:46 dollars.
4 Identication and Empirical Specication
4.1 Identication
The objective of our paper is to compare route structure, prices, and capacities
before, during, and after bankruptcy. The main concern is the following: As the rm
27We drop: tickets that are neither one-way nor round-trip travel, such as open-jaw trip tickets;
tickets involving a US-nonreporting carrier ying within North America and foreign carrier ying
between two US points; tickets that are part of international travel; tickets including travel on more
than one airline on a directional trip (known as interline tickets); tickets involving non-contiguous
domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and Territories); tickets with fares less than 20 dollars or larger than
9999 dollars; and tickets whose fares were in the bottom and top 5 percentile percentile in their year;
tickets with more than 6 coupons. We then merge this dataset with the T-100 Domestic Segment
(U.S. Carriers) and drop tickets for ights that have less than 12 departures over a quarter in one
direction (this means less than 1 departure every week in one direction).
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sinks deeper into nancial distress, it might change its strategic decisions, like prices,
capacity, and network extent to generate the cash it needs to avoid bankruptcy, but
this can lead the rm deeper into nancial distress, and ultimately to a Chapter 11
ling. This strategy is likely to be the rms desperate attempt to raise cash to avoid
the bankruptcy ling, and therefore, it is likely to occur in the period immediately
preceding bankruptcy. As a result of this pre-bankruptcy behavior, we might estimate
a lower pre-bankruptcy average price just because of the rapid drop in prices in the
quarters before the bankruptcy ling.
This problem is conceptually the same as the one in Ashenfelter (1978). In a study
of the e¤ect of training programs on earnings Ashenfelter noted that all trainees suf-
fered unpredicted earning declines in the year prior to entering a training program (see
Ashenfelter (1978, page 51)). This stylized fact has become known as the Ashen-
felter dip. Simple comparisons of earnings before and after the training program
would be misleading evidence of the e¤ect of training on earnings. To deal with
this, Ashenfelter dropped the period immediately preceding training (see Ashenfelter
(1978, page 53)). The analogy with our problem of prices and bankruptcy ling is
clear: Prices could fall prior to bankruptcy and this would dampen the di¤erences in
the prices before, during, and after the bankruptcy ling. This can be clearly seen in
Figure 1.
We follow Ashenfelter (1978) and drop observations corresponding to two quar-
ters prior to the to-be-bankrupt rms bankruptcy ling date and corresponding to
markets where this rm was present.28
To further address this concern, we apply a dynamic program evaluation approach:
We look at the average values of the variable of interest (e.g. price) one quarter before,
two quarters before, and three quarters before the rms bankruptcy ling. The key
point is to see whether there is evidence of signicant changes in prices preceding the
bankruptcy ling.
Next, we worry about the possibility of persistent correlation of negative unob-
served current and expected demand shifts (that extend beyond the pre-bankruptcy
28We repeat the analysis excluding the preceding 4 quarters and nd qualitatively similar results.
16
period we eliminate) in markets served by the bankrupt airlines relative to that in
markets served by other airlines. We address this second concern by following Fried-
berg (1998), and include linear market time trends to control for such market-specic
unobservable correlations across time.
Further, price changes triggered by demand changes spurring from seasonal or
exogenous shocks (e.g. increases in fuel costs or 9/11) can confound the e¤ects of
bankruptcy on prices. Serially correlated industry-specic shocks to demand can
also confound the e¤ects of bankruptcies on prices. To address this, we include year-
quarter xed e¤ects.
Furthermore, a carrier ying on a certain time schedule might benet business
travel in some markets but not in others, a¤ecting the price behavior of that carrier
in those markets, but not in others.29 Ignoring these sources of unobservable het-
erogeneity associated with an airlines pricing behavior can confound the e¤ects of
bankruptcy lings on prices. To address this, we include route-carrier xed e¤ects.
Finally, a carriers presence in a market can have an e¤ect on the behavior of
other carriers in that market, regardless of whether the carrier is bankrupt. Thus,
we di¤erentiate the e¤ect of a bankruptcy ling from the e¤ect that just the presence
of a rm in the market has by including the categorical variable INgt. The variable
INgt switches on when at least one bankrupt rm is in g (recall that if g = r, then
we would say that at least one bankrupt rm is in route r) at time t. This variable
is likely a function of the same unobservables that a¤ect the pricing decisions. This
leads us to discuss the issue of sample selection.
There are two sources of sample selection. The rst is related to the self-selection
of the rms into markets. In the literature, this problem is addressed by following
Veerbek and Nijman (1992), who consider the selectivity bias of the xed and ran-
dom e¤ects estimators and show that the xed e¤ect estimator is more robust to
nonresponse biases than the random e¤ects estimator. The second sample selection
issue refers to the selection of markets, since we do not have a balanced panel. Thus,
29Another example: A carrier in a given market might use more modern planes than other carriers
in that market, a¤ecting the price that all carriers in that market can charge.
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following Veerbek and Nijman (1992), we need to use market xed e¤ects. In this
paper, we include route-carrier or market-carrier xed e¤ects to address this concern,
which clearly control for market (or route) and carrier xed e¤ects. To study the
empirical importance of sample selection we present results when we run regressions
with random e¤ects and compare them with the results we obtain when we include
xed e¤ects. We show that sample selection is not an issue of empirical signicance
in our analysis, since the results are not di¤erent.
4.2 Empirical Specication
We estimate the following econometric specication:
lnQjgt = 
OWNBktOwngt + 
OTHBktOthersgt (1)
+OWNAftBktOwngt + 
OTHAftBktOthersgt + "jgt;
where "jgt is the remaining component of the regression to be discussed in detail be-
low. Here, Qjgt is one of the measures discussed in Section (3.3): NationalNetworkjt;
AirportNetworkjat; F requencyjrt, Seatsjrt, Farejmt, and LoadFactorjrt: These de-
pendent variables are run on two sets of bankruptcy categorical variables. The rst
indicates whether a competitor in a market currently operates under bankruptcy
protection, and the second indicates whether any of the rms competing in a market
previously operated under bankruptcy.
The coe¢ cient OWN measures the current e¤ect of a bankruptcy ling on the
bankrupt rms variable Qjgt. The current e¤ect on the bankrupts rm competitors
is measured by OTH . The post-bankruptcy e¤ects are measured by OWN and
OTHER. Table 3 illustrates how we identify the parameters of the regression. Note
that changes after a rms bankruptcy are computed over all quarters from the rms
bankruptcy emergence until the end of the sample period, and in the case of USAirways
that has multiple bankruptcy lings over quarters from one bankruptcy emergence
until the next bankruptcy ling. Similarly, the pre-bankruptcy period is dened as all
quarters between the beginning of the sample period until the rms bankruptcy ling ;
and for the second USAirways bankruptcy it is over the quarters between lings.
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We let "jgt be dened as follows:
"jgt = ut + ujt if g = n (unit of observation is carrier-year-quarter),
"jgt = Ingt + ujg + ut + ujgt + o(g)o (g)gt  Trendt + d(g)d (g)gt  Trendt if g = r;m;
"jgt = Inat + uja + ut + ujat + a  a  Trendt if g = a.
Ingt is the variable that controls for whether one of the rms that is ling for
bankruptcy is in g at any point in time; ujg is a g-carrier xed e¤ect, for example
a route-carrier xed e¤ect when we look at prices; ut is a year-quarter xed e¤ect;
and ujgt is an idiosyncractic unobservable. Trendt is a time trend variable, taking
values from 1 to 48. o(g) is the parameter of the origin-specic time trend, where
o (g) is the origin airport of route r or market m. d(g) is dened similarly. a is
the parameter of the origin-specic time trend when the unit of observation is the
airport-year-quarter.
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that without the appropriate
clustering, xed e¤ects regressions produce inconsistent standard errors. The ap-
propriate clustering depends on how we think that airlines behave. If, as assumed
by the literature (for example, Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992), Berry (1990)
Borenstein (1989), Berry and Jia (2010)) airlines treat each route as an independent
regional market then the clustering should be by route. This is what Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) do in their recent work. We follow their approach and in all of our
regressions we cluster the unobservables by route if the unit of observation is the
route-carrier-year-quarter. We cluster by airport if the unit of observation is the
airport-carrier-year-quarter. And we cluster by market if the unit of observation is
the market-carrier-year-quarter.
In order to interpret the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables in the semilogarithmic
regression equation above we need to transform the estimates. This is because in a
semilog regression the coe¢ cient of a dummy variable, multiplied by 100, is not equal
to the percentage e¤ect of that variable on the variable being explained. Halvorsen
and Palmquist (1980) show that to give the estimated coe¢ cient a percentage inter-
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pretation, we need to transform the coe¢ cient as follows. If the estimated coe¢ cient
is ^OWN then the percentage e¤ect of BktOwnrt on Qjrt is ~
OWN = exp(^OWN )  1:
We report the estimated coe¢ cient and the correct percentage e¤ect in the tables.
The latter is reported in squared brackets below the standard errors.
We present the results for the various dependent variables in the following format.
First, we present the main specication, where we include: i) carrier xed e¤ects or,
when the unit of observation allows for it, route-carrier or market-carrier xed e¤ects;
ii) year-quarter xed e¤ects when the observation is airport or route/market specic;
iii) when the unit of observation allows for it, origin and destination specic time
trends; and iv) we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior to the to-
be-bankrupt rms bankruptcy ling date and corresponding to markets where this
rm was present. Next, we present specications where we do not include some of
these xed e¤ects and check the robustness of the results to these omissions. Finally,
we consider a model where we follow a dynamic program evaluation approach. The
objective is to check how robust the results are to changes in the specications we
run and to get a sense of how empirically relevant the problem associated with the
potential endogeneity of the bankruptcy categorical variables is.
5 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Airline Networks
5.1 National Networks
The dependent variable for equation (1) in Table 4, is the natural logarithm of
NationalNetworkjt and equals the number of origin and destination airport pairs
served by carrier j at time t. In this specication we do not include year-quarter xed
e¤ects because we cannot use variation in the identity and number of participants in a
local market to identify the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings. Here, the level of geographical
detail is the whole US.
Column 1 presents the main specication, where we include carrier xed e¤ects
and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. We estimate
OWN equal to  0:233; OTHER equal to 0:256; OWN equal to  0:471; nally,
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OTHER equal to 0:259. They are all precisely estimated.
The economic signicance of each coe¢ cient can be gauged by looking at the
corresponding square bracket, which reports the transformed coe¢ cient as described
above. In particular, OWN equal to  0:233 means that on average rms reduce the
number of markets that they serve by 20:8 percentage when they are under Chapter
11.30 After emerging from bankruptcy protection, rms that led for bankruptcy
protection serve 37:5 percentage fewer of the markets that they were serving before
ling for Chapter 11 To understand why we nd such a strong e¤ect, recall that
our unit of observation is a carrier-year-quarter. So, each carrier is approximataly
weighted in an equal way when we estimate the average coe¢ cients. This means that
the changes in the number of markets implemented by small carriers carry as much
weight as the ones implemented by the large carriers in the coe¢ cient estimates.
To see why this observation is important, in Column 2 we exclude ATA from the
dataset. Immediately we notice that the estimate of OWN drops to  0:275, which
corresponds to a change of  24 percent in the number of markets served.
Now consider the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on the number of markets served
by the rivals of the bankrupt rms. We nd that the rivals increase the number of
the markets they serve by almost 30 percent. This change is permanent. Again this
e¤ect is very large. In the other columns we will see that such e¤ect is closer to 20
percent.
Column 3 presents the results when we do not use Ashenfelters solution, that
is we do not drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. The
results are similar to those in Column 1, which is the rst piece of evidence that
the endogeneity of the bankruptcy dummies is not empirically signicant.
Column 4 presents the results when we also exclude the carrier xed e¤ects.
Notice that the parameters are estimated almost equal to those ion Column 3,
suggesting that rm specic heterogeneity is not a concern in the empirical question
that we address in this paper.
30The percentage e¤ect is calculated as above, ~OWN = exp( 0:595)  1 = 44:8%:
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We conclude the table with Column 5, where we follow a dynamic program
evaluation approach. Instead of dropping observations corresponding to two quarters
prior to the ling, we add lag values of the bankruptcy categorical variables. Formally,
we estimate the coe¢ cients of BktOwng;t 1, BktOwng;t 2, BktOthersg;t 1 , and BktOthersg;t 2 . If the
bankruptcy dummies are exogenous, the results should be the same in Column 1 and
Column 5. Moreover, the lag bankruptcy dummies should be neither statistically nor
economically signicant. This is exactly what we nd.
Overall, the results suggest that there is very strong impact of bankruptcy lings
on the number of markets served by bankrupt rm, but and on the number of markets
served by its rivals. When looking at these results we need to keep in mind that no
time specic controls (i.e. year-quarter xed e¤ects) are included in the estimation
because we cannot separately estimate the e¤ect of the time variables and that of
the bankruptcy dummies. Next, we will consider the case where we use variation
in local markets and then we can see how robust this rst set of results is to more
controls.
5.2 Airport Networks
In Table 5 the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of AirportNetworkjat:
Recall that this is the natural logarithm of the total number of markets served by
carrier j out of airport a at time t.
Column 1 presents the results under the main specication, where we include
airport-carrier xed e¤ects; year-quarter xed e¤ects; origin specic time trends;
and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. With
AirportNetworkjat as the dependent variable we estimate OWN equal to  0:302
and OWN equal to  0:270. Both of these parameters are estimated precisely, and
they should be interpreted as corresponding to a 25 percent drop in the bankrupt
carriers network extent out of airports during and after the ling. Interestingly the
rivals of the bankrupt carrier also lower their network extent during bankruptcy l-
ings, but increase it by 8 percent after the emergence of the bankrupt rm from
Chapter 11. The e¤ects on the rivals is thus much smaller than what we found in
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Table 4. This suggests that aggregate time shocks, such as 9/11, are important
determinants of the number of markets served by carriers.
Column 2 reports the results when we do not drop observations corresponding
to two quarters prior the lings. The results are analogous to those in Column 1,
again conrming that the potential endogeneity of the bankruptcy dummies, while
in theory a serious concern, in practice is not empirically signicant.
Column 3 reports estimates from a regression that excludes origin-time trends.
We notice that the results are the same as those in Columns 1 and 2, suggesting
that, at least for this dependent variable there is no reason to be concerned about
persistent correlation of negative unobserved current and expected demand shifts
(that extend beyond the pre-bankruptcy period we eliminate) at airports served by
the bankrupt airlines relative to other airports.
In Column 4 we exclude carrier-origin xed e¤ects. So this is a random e¤ect
regression, where the random component is a carrier-origin unobservable. Notice that
the estimated coe¢ cient are remarkably smaller in this column than in Columns
1-3, where we include xed e¤ects. This conrms the nding of Table 4 that
heterogeneity across carriers is signicant.
In Column 5 we implement a dynamic program evaluation approach, along the
same lines as in Column 5 of Table 4. First, we observe that the estimates of
OWN , OTH , OWN , and OTH are the same as in Column 1. This again suggests
that the estimated coe¢ cient are not biased by the potential endogeneity of the bank-
ruptcy dummies. Second, we notice that one of the lagged dummies is statistically
signicant and its magnitude is quite large. We interpret this as evidence that, prior
to bankruptcy, the insolvent rm implements changes in its network extent, but the
magnitude of such changes are not precisely estimated.
Overall the results of Table 5 conrm a strong e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on the
route structure of airline rms. Bankrupt carriers drop markets at all their airports,
with an average change of approximately 25 percent. This is clearly a strong e¤ect.
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6 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Capacity Choices
6.1 Flights Frequency
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 6 is the natural
logarithm of Frequencyjrt, where frequency is dened as the total number of ights
served by carrier j in the route r at time t (a year-quarter).
Column 1 presents the results of the main specication, when we include route-
carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time
trends, and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
We estimate OWN equal to  0:242 and OWN equal to  0:397, both statistically
signicant. In contrast, OTH and OTH are small and imprecisely estimated. The
estimates of OWN and OWN show that bankrupt carriers drop the number of ights
in the routes they serve by 21:5 percent during the bankruptcy ling and by 32:8 after
their emergence from Chapter 11.
The results inColumn 2, where we do not drop observations corresponding to two
quarters prior the lings, suggest that there is no much evidence of an endogeneity
bias of the bankruptcy dummies, since the results are the same as in Column 1.
Similarly, the results in Column 3, where we exclude the origin and destination
specic time trends are also essentially the same as in Column 1.
The results inColumn 4 show that year-quarter xed e¤ects are crucial to identify
the e¤ect of bankruptcy ling on ight frequency. If we do not include year-quarter
xed e¤ects, we nd that frequency drops by 13:7 percent instead of 21:5 percent
during the ling. We nd that frequency drops by 23:3 percent instead of 32:8
percent after the emergence from bankruptcy. Thus, there are temporal shocks that
play an important role in determining the frequency decisions, which can confound
the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on frequency.
Instead, Column 5 shows that route-carrier xed e¤ects are not crucial for the
results. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity across route-carriers is not as important as
in Tables 4 and 5.
In Column 6 we implement a dynamic program evaluation approach. There is
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some small evidence that the bankrupt rm might have started to change its ight
frequency before the ling, but those changes were minimal, compared to those during
and after the bankruptcy ling. Notice that the estimates of the main parameters, ,
are the same as in Column 1. Together with the results in Columns 1 and 2, this
suggests that the bankruptcy dummies are not endogenous in this regression.
6.2 Capacity
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 7 is the natural
logarithm of Seatsjrt, which is the total number of seats served by carrier j in the
route r at time t.
Column 1 presents the results of the main specication, when we include route-
carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time
trends, and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
We estimate OWN equal to  0:351 and OWN equal to  0:426, both statistically
signicant. OTH is estimated equal to  0:036 and OTH equal to  0:059, and both
are precisely estimated. In economic terms this means that bankrupt rms drop their
capacity (seats) by 29:6 percent during the bankruptcy ling and by 34:7 percent after
the emergence from Chapter 11. Their rivals drop some of their capacity, but the
e¤ect is much smaller, around 5 percent both during and after the bankruptcy ling.
Columns 2-5 show that the results do not change if we do not drop observations
corresponding to two quarters prior the lings, if we drop the origin and destination
time trends, if we drop year-quarter xed e¤ects, and if we drop route-carrier xed
e¤ects.
Columns 6 shows that a dynamic program evaluation approach leads to identical
results. Again, there is no evidence that the bankruptcy dummies are endogenous,
or, at the very least, their endogeneity is not empirically important.
7 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Prices
In this Section we reconcile the evidence on the e¤ects of Chapter 11 on capacity and
network structure with the evidence on prices. We ask the following questions: How
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do prices change? What happens to the demand faced by the bankrupt rm? Finally,
what are the e¤ects of the bankruptcy lings on the marginal costs of transporting a
passenger?
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 8 is the natural
logarithm of Farejmt, which is the median price charged by carrier j in market m at
time t.
Column 1 reports results when we include market-carrier xed e¤ects, year-
quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time trends, and we drop ob-
servations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. Our estimate of OWN
equals  0:031 and OWN equals 0:044. This means that rms lower their prices by 3
percent while under bankruptcy protection, and raise them by 4:4 percent after their
emergence from Chapter 11. We nd that the rivals do not change their price in any
statistically or economically signicant way, and this result is robust across the six
specications in Table 8.
The most surprising result here is that prices actually increase after the emergence
from bankruptcy protection. That is the rst indication that bankruptcy lings
might not be e¤ectively reduce the (marginal) costs of operation.
Column 2 reports results when we do not drop observations corresponding to two
quarters prior the lings. The results are indistinguishable from those in Column 1.
The results in Column 3 show that persistent correlation of negative unobserved,
current and expected, demand shifts is an important concern. The estimated e¤ect
on prices are very di¤erent in Columns 1 and 3. In Column 1 we estimated OWN
equal to  0:031, while now it is equal to  0:056, almost twice as large. The di¤erence
in the estimated OWN is even larger. In Column 1, we estimated OWN equal to
0:044, while in Column 3 we estimate OWN equal to  0:010. We will return to this
unobserved correlation when we study the results presented in Column 6, where we
show that the linear trends adequately control for it.
Column 4 excludes year-quarter xed e¤ects, and this signicantly alters our
results. The coe¢ cient OWN equals  0:093, which would mean that under in-
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bankruptcy airline rms charge prices that are almost 10 percent lower than in the
pre-bankruptcy period. OWN equals  0:032, suggesting that some part of the price
drop is permanent. Clearly, the conclusions of our analysis would be di¤erent if we
did not control for unobserved temporal shocks, such as 9/11: We would conclude
that bankruptcy lings lead to lower prices both during and after the time when a
rm is under Chapter 11 protection.
In Column 5 we report results for a specication with route-carrier random
e¤ects. The results are essentially identical to those in Column 1. This means that
the changes in prices are estimated to be the same whether we use variation in prices
in markets where bankrupt airlines are present before, during, and after a bankruptcy
ling or whether we use variation in prices in all markets. This is important for two
reasons. First, it suggests that there are no selection problems since the results are
the same whether or not we include route-carrier xed e¤ects. Second, this eliminates
the unlikely but potentially troubling possibility that identication is just o¤ routes
that airlines keep while in bankruptcy but drop them upon emerging.
Column 6 presents the results when we follow a dynamic program evaluation
approach. Recall that this approach is useful to see the extent to which prices set by
bankrupt rms are di¤erent on time-varying unobservables that are not adequately
captured by either the year-quarter xed e¤ects or origin/destination linear trends.
Given the magnitude of the results for prices, we include three lags, instead of two as
in the previous tables. First, we nd that OWN and OWN take the same values as
in Column 1. Second, we notice that the lagged variables are small in magnitude
and decline as we move further back in time from the bankruptcy ling date. Thus,
we conclude that there might still be some di¤erence on time-varying unobservables
which is not picked up by the year-quarter xed e¤ects or by the origin/destination
linear trends, but such di¤erence does not signicantly a¤ect the estimates of the
parameters OWN and OWN .
Next, we ask what is the e¤ect of bankruptcy on a carriers load factor. A carriers
load factor is the ratio of passengers own over the number of seats, by a carrier j,
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in route r, in year-quarter t; and captures airline js capacity utilization. This is
interesting because the load factor is an indicatortells us about the demand faced by
the airlines for the following reason. We know that the bankruptcy carrier dropped
its capacity and prices did not change much. If the load factor remain unchanged or
is smaller, then this means that the bankrupt carrier must be facing a lower demand.
If the load factor increased, then this means that the bankrupt carrier might have
actually experienced an increase in its demand.
Table 9 considers the case where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of the load factor of carrier j, in route r, at year-quarter t, LoadFactorjrt. We
only run one specication, where we include market-carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter
xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time trends, and we drop observations
corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show that the bankrupt rms load factor declines
during and after its bankruptcy ling. We know from Table 7 that the bankrupt
rm decreases the number of seats available. Together, these results suggest that
the bankrupt carriers demand fell, and though the rm decreased capacity and price
during bankruptcy, the price fall was not enough to generate a high capacity uti-
lization rate (load factor). The load factor of the competitors increases, suggesting
an unambiguous shift in demand towards non-bankrupt carriers. The e¤ect on the
bankrupt carriers demand is somewhat reversed after the rm emerges from bank-
ruptcy, since the emerging carrier is able to increase prices by more than 5 percent
even though its planes are not as fully utilized as before the ling.
7.1 Prices and Marginal Costs
To investigate further why prices do not change much during and after bankruptcy
lings, we study the marginal cost of transporting a passenger. Recall that a Chapter
11 ling can grant the bankrupt rm a cost advantage over its competitors, poten-
tially explaining the marginal fall in prices observed while the rm operates under
bankruptcy. Cost savings are expected to last even after the rm emerges from bank-
ruptcy, or at least for a short time following the rms emergence. To investigate the
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explanatory power of cost driven price changes, we study changes in the marginal
cost of a seat before, during, and after each bankruptcy ling. Before we discuss this
alternative explanation, it is useful to discuss in more detail the nature of marginal
costs in the airline industry, and the distinction between accounting and economic
opportunity cost.
The accounting marginal cost of a seat is just the passenger cost associated with
issuing tickets, processing passengers through the gate, in-ight food and beverages,
and insurance and other liability expenses. This cost is very small relative to the
xed costs faced by an airline to y a plane on a route.
However, as Elzinga and Mills [forthcoming] convincingly argue, the economic
opportunity cost is the price of the ticket that could have been charged to another
passenger to y on that same plane but through a connection between two di¤erent
airports. This measure of the economic marginal cost is not observable because we
do not have the information to know what passengers the airline could have own on
that same seat. Yet, we know the lowest price that the airline charged in a quarter.
The idea here is that a reasonable approximation of the economic marginal cost is
the lowest ticket fare that a carrier charged across all of its routes.31
Notice that our denition of economic marginal cost of a seat is very helpful to
clarify an apparent paradox of the role of bankruptcy lings in the airline industry. On
one hand, while under bankruptcy protection an airline might be able to decrease the
usual business overhead costs, such as costs associated with sta¤ functions, general
administration, brand marketing, and common-use property. On the other hand, the
same airline might still be unable to lower its operating costs, which are associated
with route specic marginal costs, such as aircraft maintenance costs or fuel costs.
Thus, a bankruptcy ling can be very successful at lowering the xed overhead costs,
but not the marginal cost of a seat. The failure of the airlines to lower their operating
marginal cost is exactly what we show next.
Average Accounting Cost per Seat Mile. First, we consider the traditional
31This notion of economic marginal cost seems to be already in Borenstein and Rose [Competition
and Price Dispersion in the US Airline Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 102, no.
4, pages 664-665].
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cost measure used in the airline industry, average cost per seat mile (CSM). The
average cost to carry one passenger for one mile is known in the airline industry as the
average cost per seat mile. It is constructed using the ratio of the quarterly operating
expenses over the quarterly total of the product of the number of seats transported
and of the number of miles own by the airline. We gather data on operating expenses
from the Air Carrier Financial Reports (Form 41 Financial Data) and on the total
number of seats and miles own from the Air Carrier Statistics (Form 41 Tra¢ c).
The mean of the average cost per seat mile is approximately 9 cents per seat mile,
and can be as low as 4 cents and as high as 13 cents. This variable is not market
specic.
Panel I of Table 10 presents the mean CSM for each bankrupt carrier, across
markets and year-quarter observations, for the periods before, during and after its
bankruptcy (measured in US dollars). There is no evidence of persistent cost declines
during or after a carriers ling. In the case of United Airlines, the average CSM
prior to the bankruptcy ling is 9:4 cents, marginally rising during bankruptcy to
9:8 cents, and continuing to rise after Uniteds exit from bankruptcy, to 10:6 cents.
Similar results hold for US Airways rst ling, where average CSM pre- and during
bankruptcy was 12:1 cents, rising marginally to 12:5 cents post bankruptcy. For
ATA, Delta, and Northwest we observe that the average CSM increases while the rm
operates under bankruptcy. ATA and Northwest marginally lowered average CSM
after exiting bankruptcy relative to the in-bankruptcy CSM, yet Delta continues to
increase its CSM. It is only in the case of US Airwayssecond ling that we observe
a decline in average CSM: pre-bankruptcy this was 12:5 cents, dropping to 11:4
during bankruptcy, and continued to fall after US Airways exited court protection.
The unusual cost pattern observed to US Airwayssecond ling can be explained by
the carriers exit strategy: US Airways emerged after merging with low cost carrier
America West. Figure 2 reports a time series of CSM for United Airlines and US
Airways for the period pre-, during, and post- bankruptcy. Consistent with the above
ndings, we do not observe any signicant cost decline during or following the rms
bankruptcy ling. Evidence from the average CSM does not support the hypothesis
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that rms ling for bankruptcy protection can signicantly reduce costs and thereby
impact product market competition.
The Economic Opportunity Cost of a Seat. Following our discussion above,
for each of the bankrupt carriers, we compute the lowest ticket fare across markets
and year-quarters and summarize it in Panel II of Table 10. As with the evidence
for average CSM, we do not nd signicant changes in the economic opportunity
costs during or after the bankruptcy ling. Except for United Airlinesbankruptcy,
all other bankrupt carriers temporarily lower economic costs during bankruptcy, only
to increase it again once it emerges from bankruptcy. The pre-bankruptcy economic
cost for US Airways rst ling was 54:14 dollars, falling to 51:22 dollars during
bankruptcy, and rising to 55:33 dollars after the carrier exited bankruptcy protection.
For Delta, pre-bankruptcy economic cost was 50:44 dollars, barely falling to 49:80
dollars during bankruptcy, only to rise above its pre-bankruptcy cost to 54:09 dollars
after exiting bankruptcy. In the cases of ATA and US Airways second ling, the post-
bankruptcy economic cost is above the in-bankruptcy cost, but still slightly below the
pre-bankruptcy one; for instance, ATAs pre-bankruptcy cost was 68:51 dollars, falling
to 49:67 dollars during bankruptcy, and rising to 51:64 post-bankruptcy (relative to
the in-bankruptcy cost). These results on economic costs, pre-, during, and post-
bankruptcy, do not support the hypothesis that rms operating under Chapter 11
signicantly and permanently lower operating cost.
8 Conclusions
Our paper empirically examines whether a rms bankruptcy ling a¤ects product
market competition, using evidence from the US airline industry. We nd that bank-
ruptcy lings lead to a reduction of capacity and prices in the industry. Together
with the fact that we do not nd any evidence of changes in the marginal cost of
transporting a passenger, our results suggest that bankruptcy lings are e¤ective at
reducing xed costs but not marginal costs.
Our empirical analysis and results provide important insights on the e¤ect of
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bankruptcy lings in other industries. For example, recent evidence from the auto
industry lends support to our interpretation of bankruptcy as a fallback in a war of
attrition over capacity. On November 17, 2008; Professor Michael E. Levine published
an article in The Wall Street Journal calling for GMs bankruptcy ling. He cited
GMs excess capacity as a source of its nancial woes and argued that a Chapter 11
ling is the way for GM to successfully reduce capacity and return to protability:
"GM has about 7; 000 dealers. Toyota has fewer than 1; 500. Honda has
about 1; 000 ... GM knows it needs fewer brands and dealers, but the dealers
are protected from termination ...eliminating them and the brands they sell very
expensive. ...[GM] owns or leases enormous amounts of property for facilities
its not using and probably will never use again ...downsizing and asset shedding
will have to come..."
And in fact, once in bankruptcy, GM closed dealerships and brands. On July 8;
2009, GM sought approval from the bankruptcy judge to cancel contracts with 38
dealers; and brands such as Pontiac, Hummer, and Saturn, were sold o¤ or wound
down. These capacity cutbacks impacted equilibrium prices. In GMs rst post-
bankruptcy nancial statement (November 2009) the rm reported it had boosted
market share and hiked vehicle prices since its bankruptcy. GMs sticker prices
achieved their highest point of the 2009 calendar year in October, just after GMs
bankruptcy.
Our analysis is restrictive in a number of aspects and suggests numerous exten-
sions, which constitute themes for future research. First, our paper focuses on the
e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on product market competition, but it would be equally
interesting to investigate the determinants of bankruptcy lings. That new research
might look in more detail into the role of the entry and expansion of low cost carriers.
On the one hand, it is doubtful that it was the advent of low cost carriers per se that
led to bankruptcy lings since bankruptcies were pervasive at the beginning of the
1990s, before the surge in the number of LCCs. On the other hand, the expansion
of low cost carriers in the contemporary US airline industry might have accelerated
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the number and frequency of bankruptcy lings as well as their duration.
Second, another important feature of a bankruptcy ling is the shift of control
from equity to debt holders. We do not incorporate such a change in our paper,
as we assume that the objective of the rm is to maximize prots, regardless of
the ownership structure. Future research might look into the bargaining between
di¤erent agents. Eraslan (2007) and Eraslan and Yilmaz (2007) have made important
contributions on this while looking at personal bankruptcies.
Finally, our paper uncovers stylized empirical patterns and suggests a unifying
explanation. An interesting and challenging line of research would be to estimate
a structural dynamic model of competition that incorporates the possibility of wars
of attritions among airline rms along with the possibility to le for bankruptcy
protection. An important contribution in this direction has been made by Takahashi
[2010], who estimates the impact of competition and exogenous demand decline on
the exit process of movie theaters in the US from 1950-1965. Takahashi shows that
theaters who are making negative prots may choose to remain in the market if they
expect to outlast their competitors, because at that point their prots would increase.
Takahashi shows that this creates a signicant delay in the exit process.
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Table 1: Stylized facts 
Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry between 1992 and 2007. Airline Bankruptcies are identified from the Air and Transportation Association (ATA), and cross checked with the Bankruptcy Research Database 
from Professor Lynn LoPucki. The remaining information is obtained from news searches in Lexis‐Nexus and Factiva. 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Code   Airline Name  File 11 File 7 Voluntary Filing Nu. Date Filed  Date Emerged Convert 
11 to 7  
Convert
11 to 7  
Grounded Days 
WV  Air South, Inc.  1 0 1 1 8/28/1997  0 1 9/16/1997 8/28/1997 18
AQ  Aloha Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 1 12/30/2004  2/17/2006 0 0 0 414 
HP  America West Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 1 6/27/1991  8/25/1994 0 0 0 1138 
TZ  Ata Airlines d/b/a Ata.  1 0 1 1 10/26/2004  2/28/2006 0 0 0 490 
HQ  Business Express  1 0 0 1 1/22/1996  4/17/1997 0 0 0 445 
CO  Continental Air Lines, Inc.  1 0 1 2 12/3/1990  4/27/1993 0 0 0 864 
DL  Delta Airlines  1 0 1 1 9/14/2005  4/25/2007 0 0 0 563 
W9  Eastwind Airlines, Inc.  0 1 0 1 9/30/1999  0 0 0 9/8/1999
QD  Grand Airways, Inc.  1 0 1 2 11/28/1995  0 1 1/4/1996 1/4/1996 36
HA  Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 1 9/21/1993  9/12/1994 0 0 0 351 
HA  Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 2 3/21/2003  6/2/2005 0 0 0 791 
FLYi  Independence Air  1 0 1 1 11/7/2005  1/5/2006 0 0 0 59
KP  Kiwi International  1 0 1 1 9/30/1996  0 1 7/17/1997 10/15/1996 287 
KP  Kiwi International  1 0 1 2 3/23/1999  0 1 8/27/1999 3/24/1999 154 
BF  Markair, Inc.  1 0 1 1 6/8/1992  5/4/1994 0 0 0 686 
BF  Markair, Inc.  1 0 1 2 4/14/1995  0 1 12/4/1995 10/25/1995 230 
JI  Midway Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 2 8/14/2001  0 1 10/30/2003 9/11/2001 796 
N7  National Airlines  1 0 1 1 12/6/2000  0 1 11/6/2002 11/6/2002 690 
NW  Northwest Airlines  1 0 1 1 9/14/2005  5/18/2007 0 0 0 611 
PN  Pan American Airways Corp.  1 0 1 2 2/26/1998  6/28/1998 0 0 2/26/1998 122 
P9  Pro Air, Inc.  1 0 1 1 9/19/2000  0 1 10/5/2001 9/19/2000 376 
SY  Sun Country Airlines  0 1 0 1 1/8/2002  4/15/2002 7 to 11: 
3/13/2002 
4/15/2002 12/7/2001 97
FF  Tower Air, Inc.  1 0 1 1 2/29/2000  0 1 12/7/2000 5/1/2000 282 
TW  Trans World Airways, Llc  1 0 1 1 1/30/1992  11/3/1993 0 0 0 633 
TW  Trans World Airways, Llc  1 0 1 2 6/30/1995  8/24/1995 0 0 0 54
TW  Trans World Airways, Llc  1 0 1 3 1/10/2001  0 0 4/9/2001 0 89
UA  United Airlines  1 0 1 1 12/9/2002  2/2/2006 0 0 0 1513 
US  USAir  1 0 1 1 8/11/2002  3/31/2003 0 0 0 230 
US  USAir  1 0 1 2 9/12/2004  9/27/2005 0 0 0 375 
NJ  Vanguard Airlines, Inc.  1 0 1 1 7/30/2002  0 1 12/19/2003 7/30/2002 499 
W7  Western Pacific Airlines  1 0 1 1 10/5/1997  0 1 2/4/1998 2/4/1998 119 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Market Competition Variables 
 
  Full Sample 
  Mean  S.D. 
     
National‐Carrier Route Structure  446.14  250.65 
Airport‐Carrier  Route Structure  18.89  13.03 
Route‐Carrier  Flight Frequency  362.29  379.01 
Route‐Carrier  Number of Seats  45846.46  43310.19 
Route‐Carrier  Load Factor  0.671  0.142 
Market‐Carrier  Fare ($1993) 126.19  39.41
     
   
 3
Table 3: The Parameters Measuring the Effect of Bankruptcy Filings 
This table  illustrates how the bankruptcy dummies are  identified. We consider the bankruptcy  filing of United. At time  ‐1, United has not yet filed  for 
bankruptcy protection, hence the bankruptcy dummy of United is set to zero. At time 0, United files  for bankruptcy protection. Because United is in the 
market,  the  filing affect both United and  its  rivals.  In particular,  the effect on United  is measured by  αOWN, while  the effect on American,  its  rival,  is 
measured by αOTHER . At time 1, United emerges from bankruptcy. United is still in the market. Then, we measure the effect on United with βOWN and on 
American with βOTHER. Finally, United exits the market, so we cannot use variation in prices in this market to identify the bankruptcy effects. This clarify 
that identification is off variation in market structure and not just variation of the bankruptcy dummies over time. 
  
Time  UA is Bankrupt  UA is in Market  Effect on UA  Effect on AA 
‐1  0  1  0  0 
0  1  1  αOWN  αOTHER 
1  0  1  βOWN  βOTHER 
2  0  0  0  0 
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Table 4: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on National‐Carrier Route Structure 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of airport‐airport combinations served by carrier j during year‐quarter t. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
αOWN, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on   ‐0.233***  ‐0.247***  ‐0.201***  ‐0.210***  ‐0.221*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure  (0.089) 
[‐0.208] 
(0.093) 
[‐0.219] 
(0.075) 
[‐0.182] 
(0.075) 
[‐0.189] 
(0.075) 
[‐0.198] 
           
βOWN, Post‐Bankruptcy Effect on   ‐0.471***  ‐0.275***  ‐0.240***  ‐0.240**  ‐0.234** 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure  (0.098) 
[‐0.375] 
(0.108) 
[‐0.240] 
(0.093) 
[‐0.213] 
(0.094) 
[‐0.213] 
(0.104) 
[‐0.209] 
           
αOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the   0.256***  0.204***  0.210***  0.212***  0.186*** 
National Route Structure of the Rivals  (0.050) 
[0.292] 
(0.050) 
[0.227] 
(0.040) 
[0.236] 
(0.039) 
[0.236] 
(0.173) 
[0.204] 
           
βOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the   0.259***  0.271***  0.220***  0.222**  0.240*** 
National Route Structure of the Rivals  (0.058) 
[0.295] 
(0.059) 
[0.311] 
(0.047) 
[0.246] 
(0.047) 
[0.248] 
 
(0.048) 
[0.271] 
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
        0.074 
(0.228) 
           
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
National Route Structure of Rivals 
        0.040 
(0.452) 
           
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
        ‐0.176 
(0.166) 
           
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
National Route Structure of Rivals 
        0.103* 
(0.061) 
             
Observations  436  398  505  443  443 
Carrier Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
TZ Bankruptcy Included  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Within R2  0.165  0.143  0.132  0.132  0.147 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Airport‐Carrier  Route Structure 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of markets served out of airport a, by carrier j in the
year‐quarter t.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
αOWN, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on  ‐0.302***  ‐0.291***  ‐0.286***  ‐0.176***  ‐0.308*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Airport‐Carrier  
Route Structure 
(0.037) 
[‐0.261] 
(0.034) 
[‐0.252] 
(0.034) 
[‐0.249] 
(0.031) 
[‐0.161] 
(0.035) 
[‐0.265] 
           
βOWN, Post‐Bankruptcy Effect on  ‐0.270***  ‐0.283***  ‐0.278***  ‐0.213***  ‐0.286*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Airport‐Carrier  
Route Structure 
(0.065) 
[‐0.237] 
(0.061) 
[‐0.246] 
(0.061) 
[‐0.243] 
(0.052) 
[‐0.192] 
(0.062) 
[‐0.249] 
           
αOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the  ‐0.136***  ‐0.127***  ‐0.108***  0.095***  ‐0.127*** 
Airport‐Carrier  Route Structure of 
the Rivals 
(0.027) 
[‐0.127] 
(0.022) 
[‐0.119] 
(0.022) 
[‐0.102] 
(0.014) 
[0.099] 
(0.022) 
[‐0.119] 
           
βOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the  0.080**  0.076***  0.083***  0.109***  0.071*** 
Airport‐Carrier  Route Structure of 
the Rivals 
(0.037) 
[0.083] 
(0.030) 
[0.079] 
(0.037) 
[0.086] 
(0.015) 
[0.115] 
(0.031) 
[0.073] 
           
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect 
on Bankrupt Firm’s Airport‐Carrier  
Route Structure 
        ‐0.202 
(0.193) 
           
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect 
on Airport‐Carrier  Route Structure 
of the Rivals 
        0.051 
(0.027) 
           
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s Airport  
Route Structure 
        ‐0.212*** 
(0.026) 
           
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Airport‐Carrier  Route 
Structure of the Rivals 
        ‐0.028 
(0.020) 
           
Observations  22,318  26,115  26,115  26,115  33,788 
Number of Route‐Carrier Groups  716  718  718  718  1,173 
 
Airport‐Carrier Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Origin Time trends  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Year‐Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Within R2  0.148  0.141  0.091  0.028  0.144 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by Airport. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route‐Carrier Flight Frequency  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of departures performed in route r, on year‐quarter t, by carrier j. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
αOWN, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on  ‐0.242***  ‐0.243***  ‐0.247***  ‐0.147***  ‐0.241***  ‐0.238*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Frequency  (0.0164) 
[‐0.215] 
 
(0.015) 
[‐0.216] 
(0.015) 
[‐0.219] 
(0.012) 
[‐0.137] 
(0.016) 
[‐0.214] 
(0.016) 
[‐0.212] 
βOWN, Post‐Bankruptcy Effect on  ‐0.397***  ‐0.398***  ‐0.404***  ‐0.265***  ‐0.392***  ‐0.396*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Frequency  (0.025) 
[‐0.328] 
 
(0.024) 
[‐0.328] 
(0.0241) 
[‐0.332] 
(0.020) 
[‐0.233] 
(0.025) 
[‐0.324] 
(0.025) 
[‐0.327] 
αOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the  ‐0.014  ‐0.013  0.005  0.079***  ‐0.021  ‐0.009 
Frequency  of the Rivals  (0.015) 
[0.014] 
(0.014) 
[0.013] 
(0.014) 
[0.005] 
(0.014) 
[0.082] 
(0.015) 
[‐0.021] 
(0.014) 
[‐0.009] 
             
βOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the  ‐0.019  ‐0.026  0.011  0.123  ‐0.031  ‐0.025 
Frequency of the Rivals  (0.019) 
[‐0.019] 
(0.018) 
[‐0.026] 
(0.019) 
[0.011] 
(0.017) 
[0.131] 
(0.018) 
[‐0.030] 
(0.018) 
[‐0.025] 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s 
Frequency 
          ‐0.037*** 
(0.011) 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Frequency of the Rivals 
          0.000 
(0.016) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s 
Frequency 
          0.051 
(0.012) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on Frequency of the Rivals 
          0.028* 
(0.015) 
             
Observations  188,610  194,709  194,709  194,709  188,610  194,709 
Number of Route‐Carrier Groups  7,328  7,344  7,344  7,344  7,328  7,344 
Route‐Carrier Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year‐Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Within R2  0.074  0.074  0.029  0.013  0.073  0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
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Table 7: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route‐Carrier  Number of Seats  (Capacity ) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of seats transported in route r, on year‐quarter t, by carrier j.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
αOWN, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s 
Route‐Carrier  Capacity  
‐0.351*** 
(0.019) 
[‐0.296] 
‐0.340*** 
(0.018) 
[‐0.288] 
‐0.344*** 
(0.018) 
[‐0.291] 
‐0.315*** 
(0.017) 
[‐0.270] 
‐0.350*** 
(0.019) 
[‐0.295] 
‐0.339*** 
(0.019) 
[‐0.287] 
             
βOWN, Post‐Bankruptcy Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s 
Route‐Carrier  Capacity 
‐0.426*** 
(0.027) 
[‐0.347] 
‐0.419*** 
(0.026) 
[‐0.342] 
‐0.377*** 
(0.026) 
[‐0.314] 
‐0.324*** 
(0.022) 
[‐0.277] 
‐0.417*** 
(0.027) 
[‐0.341] 
‐0.418*** 
(0.026) 
[‐0.341] 
             
αOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the Route‐Carrier  
Capacity of the Rivals 
‐0.036** 
(0.017) 
[‐0.035] 
‐0.031** 
(0.016) 
[‐0.030] 
0.008 
(0.016) 
[0.008] 
0.024 
(0.015) 
[0.024] 
‐0.047*** 
(0.016) 
[‐0.046] 
‐0.029* 
(0.016) 
[‐0.028] 
             
βOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the Route‐Carrier  
Capacity of the Rivals 
‐0.059*** 
(0.021) 
[‐0.057] 
‐0.067*** 
(0.020) 
[‐0.065] 
0.020 
(0.023) 
[0.020] 
0.068*** 
(0.020) 
[0.070] 
‐0.077** 
(0.021) 
[‐0.074] 
‐0.067*** 
(0.021) 
[‐0.065] 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route‐Carrier  Capacity 
          ‐0.044*** 
(0.014) 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the  
Route‐Carrier  Capacity of the Rivals 
          ‐0.002 
(0.017) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route‐Carrier  Capacity 
          0.029** 
(0.014) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Route‐Carrier  Capacity of the Rivals 
          0.015 
(0.017) 
             
Observations  188,610  194,709  194,709  194,709  188,610  194,709 
Number of Route‐Carrier Groups  7,324  7,344  7,344  7,344  7,328  7,344 
Route‐Carrier Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Year‐Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Within R2  0.095  0.094  0.029  0.023  0.094  0.094 
             
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
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Table 8: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Market‐Carrier Prices   
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the median fare charged in market m, in year‐quarter t, by carrier j.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
αOWN, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Market‐Carrier  
Prices 
‐0.031*** 
(0.003) 
[‐0.030] 
‐0.030*** 
(0.002) 
[‐0.259] 
‐0.056*** 
(0.003) 
[‐0.054] 
‐0.093*** 
(0.002) 
[‐0.089] 
‐0.031*** 
(0.003) 
[‐0.030] 
‐0.037*** 
(0.003) 
[‐0.036] 
             
βOWN, Post‐Bankruptcy Effect on  0.044***  0.045***  ‐0.010***  ‐0.032***  ‐0.041***  0.042*** 
the Bankrupt Firm’s Market‐
Carrier  Prices 
(0.003) 
[0.045] 
 
(0.003) 
[0.046] 
(0.004) 
[‐0.010] 
(0.003) 
[‐0.031] 
(0.003) 
[‐0.040] 
(0.003) 
[0.043] 
αOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
the 
‐0.005*  ‐0.005  ‐0.015***  ‐0.057***  ‐0.003  ‐0.006** 
Market‐Carrier  Prices of the 
Rivals 
(0.002) 
[‐0.005] 
(0.002) 
[‐0.005] 
(0.002) 
[‐0.015] 
(0.002) 
[‐0.055] 
(0.002) 
[‐0.003] 
(0.002) 
[‐0.006] 
             
βOTHER, In‐Bankruptcy Effect on 
the Market‐Carrier  Prices of the 
Rivals 
0.008 
(0.003) 
[0.008] 
0.006 
(0.003) 
[0.006] 
‐0.011*** 
(0.002) 
[‐0.011] 
‐0.010*** 
(0.002) 
[‐0.010] 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
[0.007] 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
[0.003] 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm’s 
Market‐Carrier  Prices 
          ‐0.028*** 
(0.003) 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Market‐Carrier 
Prices of the Rivals 
          ‐0.012*** 
(0.002) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm’s 
Market‐Carrier  Prices 
          ‐0.023*** 
(0.003) 
             
Two Periods Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Market‐Carrier 
Prices of the Rivals 
          ‐0.005 
(0.002) 
             
Three Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm’s 
Market‐Carrier  Prices 
          ‐0.019*** 
(0.003) 
             
One Period Lag In‐Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Market‐Carrier 
Prices of the Rivals 
          ‐0.001 
(0.002) 
             
Observations  448,683  493,436  493,436  493,436  448,683  493,436 
Number of Market‐Group Groups  21,688  21,844  21,844  21,844  21,688  21,844 
Market‐Carrier Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Year‐Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Within R2  0.159  0.165  0.125  0.030  0.157  0.166 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by market. 
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Table 9: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route‐Carrier Load Factor 
 A  carrier's  load  factor  is defined  as  the  ratio of passengers  flown  to offered  seats, by  a  carrier  j,  in  route  r, on  year‐quarter  t.  It 
measures the airline's utilization of capacity. For example, a load factor of 1 indicates that the carrier fills the plane fully, selling every 
available seat on the plane. 
  Own Effect  Effect on Competitors 
  During  After  During  After 
 
At least on carrier in the route is bankrupt  ‐0.011***  ‐0.0141***  0.029***  0.036*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Observations  188,610 
Number of Route‐Carrier Groups  7,328 
Within R2  0.223 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
The regression includes  year‐quarter fixed effects; origin and destination time trends; route‐carrier fixed effects. We drop observations 
corresponding to two quarters prior the filings. 
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Table 10: Accounting and Economic Cost Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing 
Panel I: Accounting Seat per Mile Costs Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing (Means) 
Unit of Measure: Dollars… so 0.094 are 9.4 cents per seat per mile. Basically no reduction in costs, except in a marginal way when HP bought US. this is more a function of the 
average of HP very low that bring US down, it is not that US itself brought the operating costs down. 
  Before Bankruptcy  During Bankruptcy  After Bankruptcy 
 
United  0.094 
(0.008) 
0.098 
(0.007) 
0.106 
(0.002) 
 
US Airways, First bkt  0.121 
(0.011) 
0.121 
(0.005) 
0.125 
(0.007) 
 
US Airways, Second bkt  0.125 
(0.007) 
0.114 
(0.004) 
0.110 
(0.004) 
 
ATA  0.068 
(0.011) 
0.091 
(0.040) 
0.074 
(0.004) 
 
Delta  0.088 
(0.010) 
0.109 
(0.004) 
0.111 
(0.000) 
 
Northwest  0.095 
(0.010) 
0.116 
(0.009) 
0.110 
(0.002) 
 
Panel II: The Economic Opportunity Cost: Costs Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing 
These are lowest prices for a ticket that a carrier charges in a quarter‐year. They are averaged across the markets, year, and quarters.  
  Before Bankruptcy  During Bankruptcy  After Bankruptcy 
 
United  50.560 
(3.403) 
53.594 
(3.026) 
55.563 
(3.881) 
 
US Airways, First bkt  52.137 
(4.347) 
51.215 
(2.876) 
 
55.331 
(4.020) 
US Airways, Second bkt  53.0146 
(4.379) 
49.667 
(2.743) 
51.643 
(4.334) 
 
ATA  68.507 
(11.358) 
57.523 
(4.623) 
61.393 
(11.039) 
 
Delta  50.436 
(3.945) 
49.796 
(2.885) 
54.086 
(4.087) 
 
Northwest  50.340 
(4.007) 
46.285 
(3.436) 
49.470 
(1.931) 
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Figure 1: Explaining the Identification Problem 
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Figure 2: Accounting Costs (Seat per Mile) Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing 
The unit of measurement is US dollars 
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